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INTRODUCTION 
The ICSID Convention1 was negotiated primarily for the protec­
tion of foreign investments and considerations of economic 
development in the host state, particularly in the global south. The 
global south refers to developing countries in Africa, Latin America, 
and Asia. On the other hand, the global north is made of countries con­
sidered more developed, advanced and richer in terms of capital and 
economic development. The ICSID Convention established the Inter­
national Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID").2 
PhD (Aberdeen); Attorney at Law; Law Professor at Salmon P. Chase College of 
Law, Northern Kentucky University. A version of this article was originally presented at 
the IGLP, Harvard Law School African Regional Conference held January 17-24, 2016 at 
the University of Cape Town, South Africa. I am grateful to the editorial staff of the FAMU 
Law Review for their assistance in publishing this article. This article is dedicated to my 
father, Chief Michael I. Okpe of blessed memory. The usual caveat applies. The author may 
be reached at f.o.okpe@gmail.com. 
1. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na­
tional of other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter the 
ICSID Conventionl. 
2. See Felix O. Okpe, Endangered Element of ICSID Arbitral Practice: Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, Foreign Direct Investment and the Promise of Economic Development in 
219 
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ICSID provides facilities for conciliation and investment treaty arbi­
tration between investors and state parties.-* 
Under international law, and perhaps in the context of the IC­
SID Convention, it is fair to state that; the potential for investment 
disputes is more likely with respect to foreign investments hosted in 
the global south. In most situations when investment disputes arise, 
foreign investors often allege that an act that includes regulatory ini­
tiatives of the host state or an omission attributable to the host state, 
has occasioned a violation of applicable investment agreement.4 Some­
times the basis for the alleged breach results from underlying 
contractual claims by the foreign investor.5 Thus, investment claims 
have created the intellectual foundation for a spirited debate over 
whether the insulation of contractual claims from treaty claims should 
be standardized under international investment law and arbitration. 
There are valid arguments on both sides of the divide. In spite of good 
attempts to articulate a more acceptable position on the issue, includ­
ing the suggestion of an "integrationist approach" to reconcile the 
opposing propositions on this critical matter, the jury of scholars is still 
out on that question.6 Arbitral jurisprudence has provided little or no 
guidance on the resolution of the debate either. The underlying current 
Host States, 13 RICH J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 217, 218 (2014). See also The ICSID Convention, 
supra note 1, at art. 1(1-2). 
3. See Note, Mediation of Investor-State Conflict, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2543, 2546 
(2014). 
4. See Lise Johnson & Oieksandr Volkov, Investor-State Contract, Host state "Com­
mitments" and the Myth of Stability in International Law, 24 (3) AME. R. INT'L ARB. 361, 
362 (2013) (stating that * I il n the international law realm, tribunals have been taking a wide 
view of enforceable 'commitment' and have been imposing liability for a broad range of gov­
ernment measures (even measures of general applicability taken in the public interest) that 
interfere with those obligations"). 
5. See generally Kate Parlett, Claims under Customary International Law in ICSID 
Arbitration, 31 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN INV. L. J., 434 (2016). 
6* ^ee -*ames ^RAWFORD, Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration, 24 ARB. INT'L. 
351, 351-52 (2008). Crawford characterized the debate this way: 
No issue in the field of investment arbitration is more fundamental, or more dis­
puted, than the distinction between treaty and contract. There is a struggle between 
those who beheve bilateral investment treaty (BIT) claims should be insulated from 
contractual claims and those who want to relate the two. That struggle has led to a 
? rnnl;"rPrUK Tf and te,ndenCy t0 cari<»ture opposing positions. In these 
a * L and further reflection are necessary before any consensus 
achieve immedint ^7" 7 p[oponent in the debate are no more likely to 
the unde^nln^^Th6 t3"06! .7 if V1CWS °f any other- " • (Crawford juxtaposed 
rely on itsTn lL ' ! 7^** "the prop<**ion that a host state cannot 
Rations including hi • °g t0 COraply with its international obli-
^^im investment- on Uip°nl^ ?hS ^ •under treaties for the protection of 
first place and hv d'pfin'f ° 7' ProP°sition that an investment is, in the very 
by its laws * ^ ® transactl0n occ^"ng in the host state and governed 
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promoting the debate is the penchant of host states in the global south 
to rely on national laws as a justification for non-compliance with in­
vestment protection obligations contained in investment agreements.7 
This has become problematic in investment treaty arbitration. It has 
also led to inconsistent jurisprudence and a re- emerged "international 
minimum standard for the interpretation and adjudication of invest­
ment disputes under the ICSID Convention.8 The international 
minimum standard has resurrected in the form of standard umbrella 
clauses,that are often relied on by arbitral tribunals to elevate con­
tract claims to treaty claims, and the fair and equitable treatment 
("FET") standard on the treatment of foreign investments in the host 
state, regardless of the provisions of national law or the host state reg­
ulatory initiatives on foreign investment. The global south is still 
battling to appreciate this evolving phenomenon under international 
investment law and arbitration. More broadly, this development, more 
than anything else, has created significant confusion between consider­
ations for the protection of investments and contribution to economic 
development of the host state through foreign investment.10 The com­
mon response by host states in investment arbitration commenced 
under the ICSID Convention, have centered around the question of the 
7. The term investment agreements or international investment agreements will be 
used interchangeably with Bilateral Investment Treaties (hereinafter BITs). 
8. See e.g., SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Objections to Jurisdiction, Aug. 6, 2003, 8 ICSID Rep. 406 
Ihereinafter SGS v. Pak.l; SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance SA v. Republic of Phil., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, Jan. 29, 2004, 8 ICSID Rep. 515|here-
inafter SGS v. Phil.). 
9. An umbrella clause is a provision found in most investment agreements that im­
poses a requirement on the host state or the other contracting party to guarantee the 
observance of the obligations it entered into with investors from the other contracting party. 
A typical foreign investment agreement is usually bilateral. It is an agreement entered be­
tween two contracting states for the promotion and protection of foreign investments in 
their respective territories. A significant innovation found in these types of agreement is the 
resolution of investment disputes through the mechanism of investment arbitration under 
the ICSID Convention subject to the requirement of consent by the two contracting states. 
The investment agreement essentially protects the investment of investors from either of 
the contracting parties in the host state. For further reading on umbrella clauses. See Jar-
rod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of Contract, 
Treaty Violations, and the Divide Between Developed and Developing Countries in Foreign 
Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135 (2006). 
10. Id. at 138 (noting that "|o]ne sees that the debate over interpretation of (umbrella 
clausesl is actually the latest incarnation of a long-standing and continuing conflict between 
the investment interests of developing countries and developed countries .... |E)ven though 
such a BIT imposes reciprocal obligations on both Contracting States, its effects are asym­
metrical . . . . |T|. he disagreement over umbrella clauses in this scenario is in effect an 
extension of the enduring tension between developing and developed countries on foreign 
investments"). 
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definition of investment and their unsuccessful attempts to challenge 
investment claims based on the provisions of national laws.11 National 
laws in this respect are mostly represented by underlying contracts 
that were sometimes in conflict with umbrella clauses and FET stan­
dard12 of foreign investments under most investment agreements.1'1 A 
historical analysis is proper to guide the global south in negotiating 
effective investment agreements and reduce the over-reliance on na­
tional laws to regulate and interpret investment agreements. Granted 
that there is a lack of a consensus on the proper place of contractual 
and investment claims, the prevailing trend under international in­
vestment law and arbitration has been the subjugation of the national 
laws of the host state to an international minimum standard en­
trenched in BITs.14 This article will attempt to show that, in the days 
of yore, the international minimum standard, as the term was under­
stood under customary international law, was a controversial standard 
considered critical by proponents from the global north for the protec­
tion of foreign investments under international law.15 
There is no question that in cases of inconsistency between na­
tional laws and international law, and by extension international 
investment law, international law prevails. This notion requires fur­
ther analysis from the perspective of the global south. This article will 
locus on the nature of foreign investment disputes between host state 
Con venter'A ^rab°wsk. Comment, T,le Definition of Investment under the ICSID 
Convention. A Defense of Salmi, 15 CHI. J. INT'L L. 287, 289-308 (2014). For the approach of 
lion see Felixf n®?*"011 of "investment" in the context of the ICSID Conven-
A/fcto rtL vT' i Def"ntlon "fitment and the ICSID Convention: Matters 
J S fnf VTlToo Promotion ** °"d International Investment Law, 8 
SUSTAINABLE Dev. Law & Pol y 133, 133-154 (2017). 
the h°ft State accord forei^ investments in its territory a 
be COnsidered fair equitable. Whether a partic-
Sas been the suhWt nf " T °F meciuitable witb Terence to covered investments 
ha been a plma^ that ha* investmeat treaty arbitration. However, it 
invesVment it l! ^ m°re thr°Ugh the binoculars of international 
lix C l?Pro/P apPlicable in investment treaty arbitration. See Fe-
andCmsfndu tt ^  *W C°ntent Ration in the Oil 
national inZment^w2^cTrL T * ^  ContentA« «' Context of Inter-
see also JESWID W ^KCUSEOE ^ ^  LJ" 255' 27°-71 (2015)= 
ed„ 2010). ' INVESTMENT TREATIES 131-32 (Frank Berman 
13. See SALACUSE, supra note 12. 
EIGN INVESTMENT (ithed!20171^AHASWAMY SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOR-
still. The concepts1 thlt(clnt'inuethtotbe uS'hkHhr^tem8^ bnmt °f ^ SyStem 
were°develo^ede^n,Uie^lTOntex^rf annas'10 ""'f ^^mty^^lTtoaheM! 
porting states. The old concepts form thTednik oTnewerTreaUes^111^ 
i 
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from the global south and investors from the global north within the 
framework of the ICSID Convention."* Statistically, investment arbi­
tration under the ICSID Convention investment is significant.17 The 
trend could be attributed to the advantages that may be associated 
with the use of that mechanism.1* The settlement of investment dis­
putes is dominated by access to ICSID arbitration that includes ICSID 
Additional Facility.19 The system also accommodates a foreign investor 
whose country is not a signatory to the ICSID Convention.20 At this 
juncture, a caveat is deserving of mention. This article does not seek to 
offer ideas on how to limit access to investment arbitration under the 
ICSID Convention. On the contrary, this article offers a fresh approach 
to understanding the nature and interpretation of foreign investment 
disputes from a historical perspective through the concept of a rein­
carnated international minimum standard that is now the cornerstone 
of internationalization of investment disputes. 
This article proposes that, the internationalization of invest­
ment disputes through the theory of internationalization of state 
contracts is a reincarnated international minimum standard under in­
ternational investment law and arbitration. Most countries in the 
global south do not sufficiently understand this new standard that is 
now critical when negotiating and interpreting BITs. This article is an 
insight into the metamorphosis of this standard with reference to the 
ICSID Convention and the global south from an historical perspective. 
It references Judge Lauterpacht's opinion in the Norwegian Loans 
16. See Samuel K. B. Asante, International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reap­
praisal, 37 INT'L & COMB. L.Q. 588, 588 (1988) (suggesting that there are fundamental and 
international issues raised by the conduct of international investment law in the relation­
ship between the host states and foreign investors that is a product of a clash of juristic 
opinion and more particularly described as a 'pervasive dispute associated with both East-
West and North-South conflicts). 
17. See Catherine M. Amirfar, Dispute Settlement Clauses in Investor-State Arbitra­
tion: An Informed Approach to Empirical Studies About Law a Response to Professor Yackee, 
12 SANTA CIJVRA J. INT'L L. 303, 308 (2014). 
18. See Judith Levine, Navigating the Parallel Universe of Investor-State Arbitrations 
under the UNCITRAL Rules, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 
369, 369-70 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011). 
19. Id. 
20. See David A. Gantz, Investor-State Arbitration Under ICSID, the ICSID Additional 
Facility and the UNCTAD Arbitral Rules, U.S.-VIETNAM TRADE COUNCIL EDUCATION FORUM, 
jAug. 17 2004), http://www.usvtc.org/trade/other/Gantz/Gantz_ICSID.pdf (stating that 
"Ii]nvestor-State Arbitration has become a common occurrence in the 40 years since the 
ICSID Convention was concluded, particularly during the last ten years . . . There have 
been decisions in more than a dozen cases under NAFTA Chapter 11 (the majority under 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules), and more than 30 notices of arbitration, about 60% of 
which are between the United States and Canada ..."). Canada and Mexico are not parties 
to the ICSID Convention. 
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Case as a foundation to theorize that the nature and settlement of for­
eign investment disputes reflects the theory of internationalization of 
state contracts as the new international minimum standard. If the 
global south fails to appreciate and understand this development when 
negotiating foreign investment agreements, it can raise serious ques­
tions about the legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration. This can 
still the progressive development of international investment law and 
arbitration. Such an outcome will defeat the purpose of the ICSID Con­
vention negotiated and ratified for the promotion and protection of 
foreign investment in the host state. It is not enough for developing 
countries' governments to run from one capital to the other signing in­
vestment agreements to attract foreign investments without a clear 
understanding of their historical context, expectations, implications, 
and the obligations they create for the host state. Even if the criticisms 
of Judge Lauterpatcht's opinion are valid, this article contends that the 
premise of the ruling in that case still resonate in most arbitral juris­
prudence and scholarship. 
To address the issues raised in this article, Part I examines the 
history and evolution of the concept of international minimum stan­
dard to lay the foundation for the main contention in this article 
through the analysis of the significance of the Calvo doctrine and the 
Hull formula. Part II analyzes the theory of internationalization of 
state contracts and its nexus to the internationalization of investment 
disputes. Setting out with the ruling of Judge Lauterpacht in the Nor­
wegian Loans case, this part advances the argument that the 
unsuccessful international minimum standard under customary inter­
national law has been reincarnated in the form of standard clauses 
such as the umbrella clause and the FET found in most international 
investment agreements. Part III is the conclusion. 
I. INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM STANDARD UNDER 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
What became known as the main points of the Calvo doctrine, 
represented Latin America's fundamental objections to the interna­
tional minimum standard as recognized under customary 
international law.21 In the context of investment disputes, interna­
tional minimum standard under customary international law 
stipulates that investment claims against the host state should not be 
In£natonan™'£ M^"^ ClLatin A^rican Constitutions and 
mulrZmLi/i °5' 206 (1950)» httP^cholarship.Iaw.marquette.edu/ 
i 
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subject to national jurisdiction or diplomatic intervention where the 
foreign investor alleges a violation of international law.22 This princi­
ple has been described as one that is designed for the protection of 
investments in the host state.23 
The origin of the international minimum standard as a princi­
ple of customary international law could be traced to the investment 
activities of foreign merchants in host states who experienced "denial 
of justice" from a foreign state for the acts of states and its citizens 
considered a violation of alien property rights. The experience of the 
merchants in ancient times, developed a system whereby aggrieved 
merchants doing business in foreign states appealed to their home 
countries to intervene on their behalf with foreign states to assist in 
the collection of debts from the citizens of the latter.24 Under this sys­
tem, the merchants were authorized to take reprisals if there is no 
response after the intervention of the merchant's home state.25 In sup­
port of this mechanism, Root, the former United States Secretary of 
State and a proponent of an international minimum standard in the 
settlement of investment disputes, suggested direct military interven­
tion to settle investment claims where the system in place in the host 
state proves ineffective and discriminatory.26 On his part, Paparinskis 
explained that the international minimum standard was elaborated 
through the phenomenon of the "variety of legal techniques through 
which [s]tates could protect the rights and interests of their nationals 
abroad.'"27 Root probably wrote against the traditional belief of the 
right to reprisals against the host state in the settlement of investment 
disputes. This right of reprisals against the host state as a means of 
settling disputes is linked to the concept of "denial of justice." 
According to Paparinskis, the concept of denial of justice 
against the alien trader in the host state may be traced to early times. 
A commentator has noted that the practice was premised on the notion 
that, "[elarly European institutional writings on the treatment of 
22. See Berk Demirkol, Non-treaty Claims in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 31 LEIDEN 
J. INT'l L. 59 (2018). 
23. See RUDOLF DOLZF.R & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL IN­
VESTMENT LAW 11 (2008). 
24. See Don Wallace Jr., Fair and Equitable Treatment and Denial of Justice: Loewen v 
US and Chattin v. Mexico, 2 TRANS. DISP. MGT. (2006), http://www.transnational-dis 
pute-management.com (last visited June 4, 2015). 
25. Id. 
26. Elihu Root, The Basis of Protection of Citizens Residing Abroad, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 
517, 521-22 (1910). 
27. See MARTINS PAPARINSKIS, THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM STANDARD AND THE FAIR 
AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT 20-21 (2013). 
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aliens by their host [s]tates set the stage for later controversies in the 
area of foreign investment law."28 The effect of this concept was that 
any breach of "the natural rights" of aliens in the host state without 
justification amounted to a "denial of justice." In turn, one consequence 
of the concept of the denial of justice is that it gave birth to two sister 
theories on the treatment of alien investments in the host state: (1) the 
theory of equality with the national of the host state; (2) the theory of 
the treatment of alien property by some external standard over and 
above the principle of equality. One commentator argued that the two 
alternate theories created two similar views. Firstly, the theory of 
equality "justified trade and investments as natural rights" in support 
of the notion of the equal treatment of aliens with nationals of the host 
state. Secondly, aliens should be "treated in accordance with some ex­
ternal standard, which was higher than the national standard" in the 
host state.29 
This commentator concluded that the views associated with the 
theories were calculated to facilitate trade and investment into the 
global south by states with the capability to expand investments over­
seas that in turn developed their home economies.30 Based on this 
conclusion, it is fair to summarize that the concept of the "denial of 
justice" and the right of reprisal against the host state is nothing but a 
system designed for the protection of foreign investment in the global 
south. Paulsson argued that "[sjtate responsibility for denial of justice 
is justified, indeed required, in order to satisfy the international re­
quirement that states provide for the effective protection of the rights 
of foreigners "31 It is this notion of international requirement for 
the protection of alien property that transformed into the concept of 
the international minimum standard on the protection and settlement 
of investment disputes. 
A Furthermore, it seems that the underlying principle of the in-
swf''°n ™lmmT standard stipulates a two-way dispute resolution 
system. On the one hand, it appears to give host states legal systems, 
nrntiT K rer,lnVffment C'aimS the P"nciple of equal 
of the nt ? °n, leglslation- In other words, the underpinning 
krisLtfnn of standard in 'his respect espouses the 
other hand L i U f°reign invest™at disputes. On the 
other hand, the standard gave foreign investors the option of diplo-
^19 LAW ON FORE.GN INVEST-
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. JAN PAUESSON, DEN,A,. OK JUST.CE IN INTEHNAT,ONA.. LAW 7 (2005). 
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matic intervention to settle investment disputes in so far as they can 
allege a violation of international law. This article will now examine 
how the Calvo doctrine responded to the two-way dispute resolution 
system on the settlement of investment dispute in the host state. 
A. The Principles of the Calvo Doctrine 
Calvo's argument on the protection and settlement of invest­
ment claims in the host state opposed the international minimum 
standard under customary international law. Under the Calvo doc­
trine, a state is entitled to freedom from external interference in the 
exercise of its sovereignty.32 Calvo advanced the concept of "national 
treatment. !,i He was opposed to the concept of the international mini­
mum standard in the conduct of foreign investment and the protection 
of alien property in the host state in the manner canvassed under cus­
tomary international law. By national treatment, Calvo argued that 
jurisdiction lies with the national courts of the host state over invest­
ment disputes.34 Mourra explained that the substantive element of the 
Calvo doctrine, "emphasizes that host states shall not grant any rights 
or benefits to foreigners that exceed those accorded to their own na­
tionals."35 The procedural elements of the Calvo doctrine argued 
against any special remedies, privileges, or incentives for foreign inves­
tors except the same as available to nationals of the host state.36 
In Shan's opinion, the Calvo doctrine consists of three funda­
mental elements: "anti-super-national-treatment . . . exclusive local 
jurisdiction, and the exclusion of diplomatic protection" in the conduct 
of foreign investment by the host state with foreign investors.37 The 
Calvo doctrine was so widely received that a majority of Latin Ameri­
can countries enshrined its principles in their national constitutions 
and investment regimes.38 The doctrine also found its way into the 
United Nation's new International Economic Order Charter at the 
32. Garcia-Mora, supra note 21, at 206. 
33. Wenshua Shan, From "North-South Divide" to "Private Public Debate": Revival of 
the Calvo Doctrine and the Changing Landscape in International Investment Law, 27 NW. 
J. INT'L & BUS. 631, 632 (2006-2007). 
34. Id. 
35. Mary H. Mourra, The Conflicts and Controversies in Latin American Treaty-Based 
Disputes, in LATIN AMERICAN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 5, 8 (Mary H. Mourra & 
Thomas E. Carbonneau, eds., 2008). 
36. Id. 
37. Shan, supra note 33, at 632. 
38. DONALD SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE: A PROBLEM OF INTER-AMERICAN AND INTERNA­
TIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY 20-30 (1955). 
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time, with one source stating that Latin America's contributions to the 
emergence of the Charter were "no more than a thinly-disguised at­
tempt to endow the Calvo doctrine."39 
Opponents have criticized the principles of the Calvo doctrine 
as being too extreme.40 Indeed, some critics of the Calvo doctrine have 
argued that a strict adherence to the doctrine would make it difficult 
for host states to be bound by the rules of international law on foreign 
investments.41 Root rejected the underlying principles of the Calvo doc­
trine.42 He argued that the international minimum standard, as 
understood under customary international law should be accepted as a 
fundamental standard of justice for the protection of foreign 
investments.4,3 
Root's criticism is indicative of the following propositions: (1) in­
ternational law provides a simple standard of justice for the resolution 
of foreign investment disputes; (2) domestic law of the host countries 
must conform to international standard; and (3) foreign investment 
disputes should not be subject to national treatment. There are legiti­
mate questions that may be raised against the Calvo doctrine, but 
Roots position is problematic because the international standard of 
justice he relied on begs the question of how that same international 
order or standard of justice should be defined or applied. This is a 
weakness in Root s proposition. The inability of Root to address this 
weakness makes his objections significant, but unsustainable. 
If Root's major concern was the need for an effective mechanism 
for the protection of foreign investment in the host state, the sugges­
tion canvassed by Root is incomplete and not persuasive enough. The 
premise of Root's arguments does not reflect a balanced approach to 
the necessity for the protection of foreign investment in host states, at 
least from the perspective of developing countries in the global south. 
That necessity is consideration for the economic development of the 
host state. It is contended that an international order articulated by 
Root, can only be sustained through a framework and jurisprudence 
that supports adequate and equal consideration of the legitimate ex­
pectations of all the actors in the foreign direct investment ("FDI") 
Diplomatic Protection of Nationals Abroad: An Elementary Princi-
supra note 33^  at 632^33. R ACK' 69 AM. J. INT'I. L. 359, 361 (1975,; SEE aTso Shan. 
POUCYIZ IZCWLK «SLSTERNATI0NAL LNVESTMENT LAW: REUONC'LING 
HilLncTtrZ^naf7,C- ^  & L°Uis J' Yod«. ICSlD <">* Calvo Clause a Hindrance to Foreign Direct Investment, 5 OHIO ST. J. Dise. RKSOL 75 75-95 (1989) 
42. Root, supra note 26, at 527-28 ' 
43. Id. 
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paradigm. If the primary concern of host states in entering interna­
tional investment agreements is to liberalize their investment climate 
through the protection of investments, the nature of investment dis­
putes should also reflect the purpose for that protection.44 That 
purpose is considerations for contribution to economic development of 
the host state. There is also an emerging school of thought that part of 
that purpose should include scrutinizing the impact of investments on 
human rights, public health, and the environment.45 
Root made his arguments against the background of the need 
for the protection of foreign investments in the host state, while Shan 
made her observations based on the proliferation of international in­
vestment agreements to promote investment liberalization. Shan made 
a better argument. The inclination of most Latin American states to re­
think foreign investment liberalization in their respective economies 
and consent to investment treaty arbitration, particularly under the 
ICSID Convention, supports Shan's thesis. One source observed that 
there is a worldwide trend to reject what is considered as "neo-liberal-
ist investment instruments" in favor of a more "balanced regime for 
international investment."46 Still, the most direct challenge to the 
Calvo doctrine came through what is referred to as the Hull formula 
that emerged because of the expropriation of the investments of Ameri­
can citizens in Mexico.47 
B. The Origin and Demise of the Hull Formula 
The Hull formula was coined from the diplomatic exchanges be­
tween the United States Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and the 
Mexican Ambassador to the United States over the Mexican govern­
ment's alleged agrarian expropriation of properties of American 
citizens in Mexico.48 The exchanges on the applicable law on the na­
ture and resolution of the dispute reflect divergent views. The 
diplomatic exchanges made the Hull formula to be, arguably, the most 
44. Omar E. Garcia-Bolivar, Economic Development at the Core of the International 
Investment Law Regime, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 587 
• Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011). 
45. See Tamar Meshel, Human Rights in Investor-State Arbitration: The Human Right 
to Water and Beyond, 6 J. INT'L DISP. SETTLEMENT 277, 277 (2015). 
46. Wenhua Shan, Calvo Doctrine, State Sovereignty and the Changing Landscape of 
International Investment Law, in REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW 247, 298 (Wenhua Shan, et al. eds., 2008). 
47. See discussion infra, § I.B. 
48. Telegram from Cordell Hull, Sec'y of State, U.S., to Castillo Najera, Mex. Ambassa­
dor to the U.S. (July 21, 1938), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frusl938v05/ 
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notable approach to the unfair treatment of alien property in the terri­
tory of the host state. According to Hull: 
The taking of property without compensation is not expropriation. 
It is confiscation. It is no less confiscation because there may be an 
expressed intent to pay at some time in the future. If it were per­
missible for a government to take the private property of the 
citizens of other countries and to pay for it as when, in the judg­
ment of that government, its economic circumstances and its local 
legislation may perhaps permit, the safeguards which the constitu­
tions of most countries and established international law have 
sought to provide would be illusory .... We cannot question the 
right of a foreign government to treat its own nationals in this fash­
ion if it so desires .... But we cannot admit that a foreign 
government may take the property of American nationals in disre­
gard of the rule of compensation under international law. Nor can 
we admit that any government unilaterally and through its munici­
pal legislation can, as in this instant case, nullify this universally 
accepted principle of international law, based on its reason, equitv 
and justice.49 
The Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs embraced the Calvo doctrine 
and responded this way: 
My Government maintains . . . that there is in international law no 
rule universally accepted in theory nor carried out in practice, 
which makes obligatory payment of neither immediate compensa­
tion nor even deferred compensation, for expropriations of a general 
and impersonal character like those which Mexico has carried out 
for the purpose of redistribution of the land. The expropriation 
made, in the course of our agrarian reform, do, in fact, have this 
double character which ought to be taken very much into account in 
order to understand the position of Mexico and rightly appraise her 
apparent failure to meet her obligations. Without attempting to re­
fute the point of view of the American Government, I wish to draw 
your attention very specially to the fact that the agrarian reform is 
not only one of the aspects of a program of social betterment... but 
ah°KC0AT fulfilling of the most important of the demands 
1 f f1Can ptT ' ' ; • Nevertheless Mexico admits, in obedi-
h^Hprrvn'f ^ ^  ^  i§ indeed Undet" obligations to 
itSnlfr adequate manner; but the doctrine which she 
onininrm of t ° su J® ' w^!ch is based on the most authoritative 
and mannor of61"8 °k** °U international law, is that the time 
laws.™ Payments must be determined by her own 
Leach, Sovereign o/so Leo T- Klssam & Edmond K. 
FORDHAM L. REV. 177. 182-90 (1959) AbroSation of Concession Contracts, 28 
50. Eduardo Hay, Max. Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Josephus Daniels, Am. Ambas-
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A synthesis of the Hull formula and the Calvo doctrine espouses 
two opposite principles on the settlement of foreign investment dis­
putes. The Hull formula proposes that the taking of alien property by 
the host state is proper provided there is adequate and prompt com­
pensation. In articulating the Hull formula, the proponent did not 
define nor explained what constitutes an adequate, effective, or prompt 
compensation as a remedy under customary international law. On the 
other hand, the Calvo doctrine, as presented by the Foreign Affairs 
Minister of Mexico, rejected the Hull formula on the treatment of alien 
property by insisting on a consideration of the public interest as the 
basis for the expropriation of alien property to mitigate the state's obli­
gation through national treatment in accordance with national law.51 
The Mexican government's position espoused the principle of national 
treatment as opposed to the prompt, adequate, and effective compensa­
tion proposed and argued by the Hull formula. The two divergent 
positions reflected a conflict between an international minimum stan­
dard and national treatment. National treatment is premised on the 
national law of the host state. 
The foundation of the Hull formula is rooted in the notion of an 
international minimum standard, while the position advanced by Mex­
ico is grounded in the principles of the Calvo doctrine. The opposing 
views on the expropriation of foreign investment and the settlement of 
the resulting dispute in the host state, defined the nature of foreign 
investment with respect to the global south at the time.52 So much so, 
that in 1962, the debate over the Calvo doctrine and Hull formula 
found its way to the General Assembly of the United Nations ("the 
UN").53 The UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 rejected both doc­
trines by declaring in part that: 
[Requisitioning [of alien property] shall be based on grounds or 
reasons of public utility, security or the national interest . . . both 
domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be paid appro­
priate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the 
State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in 
accordance with international law . . . where the question of com­
pensation gives rise to a controversy, the national jurisdiction of the 
State taking such measures shall be exhausted.54 
sador in Mex. (Aug. 3, 1938), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frusl938v05/ 
d663. 
51. Hay, supra note 50. 
52. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 14. 
53. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), H 4 (Dec. 14, 1962), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/c2psnr 
•htm. 
54. Id. 
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Based on Resolution 1803,55 the opposition of developing coun­
tries to the Hull formula was largely successful. Guzman noted that 
the Hull formula "ceased to be a rule of customary international law" 
because of the challenge mounted by countries in the global south.56 
Guzman's observation was based on the premise that, "the majority of 
the developing world supported a less stringent compensation require­
ment for expropriations than the Hull Rule's 'prompt, adequate, and 
effective' standard."57 The glee with which developing countries em­
braced the UN Resolutions raised valid concerns about the protection 
of foreign investments in the host state. It was after the unfortunate 
fate of the concept of the international minimum standard that the IC-
SID Convention was discussed, negotiated, and ratified. 
Under the ICSID Convention, the theory of internationalization 
of state contracts has been consistently upheld through the interpreta­
tion of applicable investment agreements and treaties.58 This theory 
elevates investments disputes from national jurisdiction in support of 
the application of an evolving international investment law.59 The util­
ity of this theory in investment arbitration after the failure of the Hull 
formula and the Calvo doctrine is a way to restore investors' confidence 
on the protection of foreign investments in the hope that the promotion 
of foreign investment for economic development may not be hampered. 
The remaining part of this article examines the significance of the the­
ory of internationalization of state contracts in the context of the 
preceding analysis. 
II. THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONALIZATION OF STATE CONTRACTS 
The legal relationship between the host state and foreign inves­
tors in international investment law and arbitration may be created by 
state contracts. A state contract is "a contract made between the state, 
or an entity of the state . . . created by statute within a State that is 
55. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), H 4. 
uh r,7 ^7r7 T; 7Zman' Wky LCDS Stg" Treaties that Hwt Them: Explaining the Pop 
ularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VIRG. J. INT'I,. L 639 641 (1998) 
57. Id., at 647. 
T,O1A^Z'42(20~G ™ S°™": ST™ C— INTERN/ 
of linvestmPnU8'H™? th*Vthe ICSI° Convention essentially a procedure for resolutio 
na ra 77lt7 KbfWfen StuteS 3nd f°reiffn investors' b^ed on the model of inter 
bUt Pr°Viding an exP'icit basis of authority for th 
bflateri i V V,rtUe ofthe habitual reference to ICSID in almost a 
tional commercial .'rh't inves '"e"1 treaties, it is fair to say that this version of interna 
treaty arbitration"). ' " 100 a& eC°me the standard Procedural model of investmen 
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given control over an economic activity, and a foreign national or a le­
gal person of foreign nationality."60 State contracts create 
international obligations for the host state and the foreign investor in 
the conduct of foreign investment.61 The theory of internationalization 
of state contracts posits that, regardless of any clear choice of law be­
tween the host state and the foreign investor on the law applicable to 
an investment claim, the principles of international law supersede na­
tional laws in the interpretation of the obligations and liabilities of the 
host state in the event of an investment dispute.62 Maniruzzaman ex­
plained the theory this way: 
The theory of internationalization of state contracts poses some of 
the hardest questions that relate to both public and private interna­
tional law. The theory suggests that, no matter what law the 
parties to such a contract choose as the proper law of the contract, 
international law superimposes their choice and applies automati­
cally as the overriding governing law. Thus where the law of the 
host state applies as the sole applicable law either by virtue of the 
parties' express choice or by the conflict of laws rule closest connec­
tion in the absence of such choice, the theory of internationalization 
triggers off not only the theoretical controversies of monism versus 
dualism of public international law but also the issues of party au­
tonomy and the doctrine of the proper law of the contract in private 
international law. Besides theoretical interest, the matter has great 
practical importance in the real world of foreign investment dispute 
settlement.63 
Prior to Maniruzzaman's thesis, there was a strong argument 
for the theory in the dissenting opinion of Judge Lauterpacht in the 
landmark decision in the Case of Certain Norwegian Loans.64 
In this case, while conceding to the view of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) that an international contract 
may be subject to national law, Judge Lauterpacht held that where 
national legislation is contrary to the international obligations of the 
host state, the notion that national legislation is exclusive and applica­
ble in the settlement of an investment dispute is "subversive of 
international law."65 He stated that, "it is not enough for a state to 
60. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., State Contracts, 3, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2004/11, 
U.N. Sales No. E.05.II.D.5 (2004). 
61. See generally Lise Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, Investor-State Contracts, Host 
-State "Commitment" and the Myth of Stability, 14 AM. REV. INT'I. ARB. 362-414 (2013). 
62. A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, State Contracts in Contemporary International Law: Mon-
ist versus Dualist Controversies, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 309, 309 (2001). 
63. Id. 
64. Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1957 I.C.J. 9 119571 (July 6). 
65. Id. at 37 (Lauterpacht J., dissenting). 
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bring a matter under the protective umbrella of its legislation, possibly 
of a predatory character, in order to shelter it effectively from any con­
trol by international law."66 According to Judge Lauterpacht, because 
an "international contract" may be subject to some national law, "does 
not mean that that fsicj national law is a matter which is wholly 
outside the orbit of international law."67The reasoning of Judge Lau-
terpacht's opinion was based on the notion that national law may not 
be applied to the interpretation of state contracts [investment agree­
ments] where such application is a violation or conflicts with 
international law. Judge Lauterpacht explained that, "the question of 
conformity of national legislation with international law is a matter of 
international law."68 
In the Norwegian Loans case, the French government instituted 
proceedings on behalf of French investors who held bond certificates 
issued by Norwegian financial institutions.69 The dispute specifically 
pertains to certain loans floated through the Mortgage Bank of the 
Kingdom of Norway and by the Small Holding and Workers Housing 
Bank. 0 At the proceedings, the Norwegian government premised its 
preliminary objection to the admissibility of the French government's 
claim on the grounds that the subject matter of the dispute is within 
the domain of national law and not international law.71 In other words, 
orway claimed that the PCIJ lacks jurisdiction because the compul­
sory jurisdiction of the court in relation to the parties involved is 
restricted to disputes concerning international law, and therefore the 
aim put forward by France is not admissible by the Court. The foun-
inflnl 0.f,Jufdge LauterPacht's dissenting opinion is probably 
fluenced by two instructive arguments by France in reply to the Nor-
S preliminary objections on the admissibility of' the claims. 
cernin^h6 C°™pete?Cf.and Jurisdiction of the PCIJ in all disputes con-
and hfpv lnterPretation of a treaty, any question of international law 
tTonaoZ r'u 7 ^  ^  constitute* a violation of an interna-
accentanrp nf f* aCCepted by Norw^ and Fruiice through 
the recover^ f™ TufHlsory Junsdiction of the PCIJ.7* Secondly, that 
^ernmenT ^ ™ inte™tional loan claim from the 
government of the debtor state by the government which has adopted 
66. Certain Norwegian g (Ju]y g) 
68. Id. 
69. Certain Norwegian Uans (Fr. v. Nor.,, Judgment, 1957 I.C.J. 9 (July 6,, at 39. 
71. Id. at 40. 
72. Id. 
2QY1 INTERNATIONALIZATION OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 235 
the cause of its nationals who are holders of bond certificates, raises an 
issue that falls withm the competence of the PCIJ by virtue of the ac-
ceptance by both parties.73 
There is no question that the transactions in issue are invest­
ments in the context of trans-border or foreign investment by French 
citizens in the territory of Norway. Judge Lauterpacht's opinion on the 
primacy of international law in the interpretation of state contracts 
involved in foreign investment dispute, underscores the theory of the 
internationalization of state contracts. This is also evident in Maniruz-
zaman's explanation above. Maniruzzaman's depiction of the theory 
sheds light on the trend by host states, mostly from the global south, 
to provide expressly the law of the host state as the proper law or 
applicable law' in what he calls "economic development agreements."74 
In this context, economic development agreements mean international 
or foreign investment agreements between the host state and the for­
eign investor. Maniruzzaman's submission addressed the question of 
internationalization of state contracts through the prism of the Monist 
and Dualist schools of thought in international law.75 
Monism and Dualism represent two opposing theories on the 
relationship between international law and national law.76 Proponents 
of the Monist school of thought maintain that the application of na­
tional law to foreign investment disputes should be subject to the rules 
of international law.77 The adherents of the dualism school of thought 
insist that, international law "is inherently distinct and requires states 
to undertake certain actions before international principles may be re­
lied upon in national courts.'"78 Except for the relevance of the Monist 
and Dualist school of thoughts to the theory of the internationalization 
of state contracts, the merits and demerits of the contentions of the two 
schools of thoughts are outside the scope of this article. However, anal­
ogously, Judge Lauterpacht's opinion makes the proposition that 
national law is inferior to international law in the adjudication of for­
eign investment disputes.79 Judge Lauterpacht's views on the 
supremacy of international law have been criticized by many a scholar 
73. Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1957 I.C.J. 9 (July 6), at 40. 
74. Maniruzzaman, supra note 62, at 309. 
75. Id. 
76. See D. A. Jeremy Telman, A Monist Supremacy Clause and a Dualistic Supreme 
Court: The Status of Treaty Law as U.S. Law in BASIC CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
AW: MONISM AND DUALISM (Marko Novakovic ed. 2013.) 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1957 I.C.J. 9, 37 (19571 (July 6) 
auterpacht J., dissenting). 
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of international law. For example, Brownlie opined that Judge Lauter 
pacht's doctrine of Monism is "antipathetic to the legal corollaries of 
the existence of sovereign states, and reduces municipal law to the sta­
tus of pensioner of international law."80 
In criticizing Judge Lauterpacht, Brownlie observed that thp 
formers view on the theory of Monism "takes the form of an assertion 
of the supremacy of international law even within the municinal 
sphere, coupled with well-developed views on the individual as a sub­
ject of international law."8' On his part, instead of offering a criticism 
udge Fitzmaunce advocated a cautious approach when relying on the 
^assaasaxt 
wolwiftoTaveWoT °f Whet,her the alleSed breach of contract 
fore it l n H K involved a violation of international law. There­
in f' f k if tWr°ng 0 attribute to him the view that if there is 
n fact a breach by a [sjtate of a contract between itself and a for 
not afforded to the foreigner'in'the local'co'urts "g »°^ WaS 
ing thepri2cv 0OntirnS't°f J nge LauterPacht'a "P^on in articulat-
hilhlighted mlinlv fhr™ Non***» Loans Case was 
FiCauritreavea Mn dSmS ^ by Br°Wnhe and by 
Pacht's o^ion rthecase uXTof: th3t Judge LaUter 
the theory of international- +• ^erence cannot be an authority for h»s«, z zzzzzzzzz rn,1 m"— does not create an internet- i • • state contract "on its own 
law is designated by the conTracting'nart;011 TT ' u°Ugh international 
the contract."85 Maniruzzaman'* partles to be tbe governing law of 
in the context of international cn°nC 1S credible and persuasive 
Maniruzzaman, international r mmercial arbitration. According to 
Of private international characteXXweXX11 "particularly 
' However, Maniruzzaman's con-
si. 
37 BMR. YR. ^Wht-The Scholar as a Judge: Part 1, 64-5, 
83. Id. 
84. Maniruzzaman, supra note 62, at 313. 
86. Id. 
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elusion, after his analysis of Judge Lauterpachfs dissenting opinion in 
the Norwegian Loans Case, is not consistent with the nature of foreign 
investment disputes with respect to investment treaty arbitration On 
the one hand with reference to investment treaty arbitration, state 
contracts with foreign investors are by their nature internationalized 
Once concluded, state contracts create international obligations on 
host states under applicable international investment agreements to 
guarantee the full faith and purpose of the clauses contained in appli­
cable investment agreements or investment dispute resolution 
mechanisms such as under the ICSID Convention. The reality of the 
international investment law regime makes the operation of state con­
tracts subject to considerations of the obligations of the host state on 
the protection of foreign investment. These considerations are now 
grounded in arbitral practice and international investment law.87 On 
the other hand, the advent of investment treaty arbitration is the evi­
dence that foreign investors may now commence arbitration directly 
for claims arising from state contracts in the host state. 
Brownlie s criticisms and Judge Fitzmaurice's caveat against 
the opinion of Judge Lauterpacht in the Norwegian Loans Case has 
been diminished by the progressive development of international in­
vestment law and arbitration. Brownlie wrote at a time when only 
sovereign states were subjects of international law. The ICSID Con­
vention and other international investment agreements that provide 
mechanisms for the resolution of foreign investment disputes, have 
trashed the premise of Brownlie's criticisms. Foreign investors are now 
subjects of international law in the context of investment treaty arbi­
tration for the settlement of foreign investment disputes.88 Judge 
Fitzmaurice's caveat was an attempt to limit Judge Lauterpacht's 
opinion to the jurisdictional aspect of the Norwegian Loans Case. 
...8v7mSee e'g-> Francisco O. Vicuna, Of Contracts and Treaties in the Global Market, 8 
MAX PLANCK Y.B. United NATIONS L. 341, 346 (2004). 
88. See Jose E. Alvarez, Are Corporations "Subjects" of International of International 
W> 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 1, 23 (2011) (stating that, "|i]f foreign businesses are, within 
e context of BITs and FTAs, really subjects of international law because they are given 
e ability to make claims directly against host states, arguably the investment regime is 
not just a particularized application of traditional espousal practice. If, as some scholars 
an arbitral decisions are beginning to suggest, investor-state arbitration is wholly new 
mechanism designed to permit a new subject of international law to have equal standing 
a ongside and old (state) subject of international law, a number of legal consequences could 
emerge. If the right of this new subject of international law is in no sense derivative of the 
ig t of its home state ... it could follow that home states no longer retain the right to waive 
e right of their investors to file a claim."); see also Tillman R. Braun, Globalization: The 
riving Force in International Investment Law, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT AR­
BITRATION 491-506 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010). 
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Judge Fitzmaurice attempted to make this distinction by creating the 
impression that Judge Lauterpacht's opinion might have been differ­
ent if the latter was called upon to consider the substantive question of 
whether a breach of state contract in that case involved a violation of 
international law.89 With due respect, Judge Fitzmaurice's caveat is 
speculative. There appears to be no indication that Judge Lauterpacht 
might have viewed the issues raised in the preliminary objections to 
the jurisdiction of the PCIJ differently in a substantive hearing. Judge 
Lauterpacht himself noted in the same opinion that: 
It seems a sound principle of judicial procedure that, unless the pro­
visions of its statute or other cogent legal considerations make that 
impossible, the Judgment of the Court should attach to the submis­
sions of the Parties a purpose, though not necessarily an effect 
which the Parties attach to them. Applied to objections to the juris­
diction of the Court, that principle means that, when a party has 
advanced objections to the jurisdiction of the Court, the decision on 
the question of jurisdiction must be reached by reference to ejec­
tions which in the intention of the Party advancing them, are 
principal rather than subsidiary and which are substantial rather 
than formal.90 
• t t The cr®dlblllty of Judge Fitzmaurice's caveat, if at all, is incon­
sistent with the reality of international investment law and arbitration 
regime, particular y under the ICSID Convention. This is so, because, 
nftl T ? es*abllshed ln ^vestment arbitral practice that more 
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annllThl f lmPlicated in the investment agreement 
ing that investment dispute." Guzman advanced this by argu-
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This recognition and practice in most investment arbitration case law 
resonates more with the opinion of Judge Lauterpacht in the Norwe­
gian Loans Case. Foreign investors have often alleged a violation of 
international law or obligation against the host state resulting from 
the act or omission to guarantee non-interference with the contractual 
rights of the foreign investors in state contracts or any other invest 
ment agreement regulating the transaction.95 Judge Lauterpacht's 
dissenting opinion is predicated on his acceptance of the complaint of 
the French government; that the subsequent currency legislation en­
acted by Norway suspending the operation of the gold clause attached 
to the loans bonds, was an act that interfered with the state contract 
with the French bond holders.®- The act by the Norwegian government 
was contrary and in conflict with its obligations under international 
law and thereby made Norwegian law inapplicable.95 According to 
Judge Lauterpacht, "it is that very legislation, in so far as it affects 
French bondholders, which may be the cause of violation of interna-
tional law of which France complains."96 
It is important for the global south to understand that, since the 
ruling of Judge Lauterpacht in the Norwegian Loans Case, there have 
been deliberate attempts by investors from the global north countries 
to facilitate the process of internationalization of investment disputes 
or the protection of investments.97 Notable examples of the process of 
internationalization include the birth of the ICSID Convention and the 
1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention of Investment Abroad.98 The 
brella clause in a BIT or international investment agreement is that the host state 
undertakes to abide by its contractual agreement with the foreign investor. See Kenneth J. 
fin'fomn B."'ATRRAL INVESTMKNT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND INTERPRETATION 256-
4U10) (noting that the observance of obligations clause is referred to as an umbrella 
"because ifc brings contractual commitments within the coverage, or umbrella, of the 
93. See Johnson & Volkov, supra note 4. 
94. Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1957 I.C.J. 9 (July 6), at 34-66 
Lauterpacht J., dissenting). 
95. Id. at 35. 
96. Id. at 37. 
97. See generally Stephen M. Schwebel, The Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
on Customary International, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 27 (2004). 
98. The history of the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention of Investments Abroad Iherein-
a er the Abs-Shawcross Draft) may be credited with the origin of umbrella clauses as the 
rm ls understood under international investment law and arbitration today. See Wong, 
supra note 9, at 146 (citing the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
^ereinafter the OECD Draft) Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property. 
OFf'n State^ Abs-Shawcross Draft influenced certain draft conventions of the 
at Bra1> particularly Art. 2 of the OECD Draft which provides that, "|e]ach party shall 
a times ensure the observance of undertakings given by it in relation to property of 
na lona's °f any other party."); see also, Anthony C. Sinclair, The Origins of Umbrella 
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Abs-Shawcross Draft was a private effort that was aggressively pushed 
by "European lawyers" for the protection of foreign investments in the 
global south." The intention of the Abs-Shawcross Draft was to secure 
the protection of foreign investments under international law 100 This 
effort was successful to the extent that its semblance found its wav to 
the OECD Draft. The OECD Draft, which embodied the core recom­
mendation of the Abs-Shawcross Draft on the protection of foreign 
investments in the host state, failed to pass the OECD Council that 
considered its propriety at the time."" However, the OECD was able to 
recommend Article 2 of the draft convention to member states to utilize 
m their BITs. 1 This would allow member states to affirm the applica­
tion of international rules as the international minimum standard for 
the regulation and protection of foreign investments in the host state 
The recommendation has been widely accepted.1" It is now referred to 
as umbrella clauses found in the model investment agreements or trea-
Ue.of member states of the OECD used as templates to negotiate BITs 
with countries mostly from the global south.1" To understand the un 
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102. Id. 
103. Id. 
pines, ConceniiTh "VroIruitlon'and* Iter' Conf®d®ration and the Republic of the Philij 
Mar. 31, 1997, at art. X "(entered into Switz.-Phil 
• unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2174 (nrr "H" 1997), http://investmentpolicyhu 
-rve any obligation it has Contracting Part/shall ol 
investors of the other Contracting Party") sPecifa investments in its territory b 
1 (1.1 \\I r\r\ t-r . «/ • 
uv-tuig ri 
Uo- Wong, supra note 9, at 147. 
106. Sinclair, supra note 98, at 414. 
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hands of the Iranian government.™ The AIOC unsuccessfully pursued 
fgtePSr^ Ue 7, r3!10?' b6f°re the t^ernationaf Court 0f Justice ( ICJ ). The failure of its legal attempts at resolving the dis­
pute under international law was linked to a defective provision in the 
concessionary agreement.108 e 
The dispute was later settled under a subsequent government 
regime that was more open to foreign investments in Iran and on terms 
that deviated from the original advice of counsel.™ It is notewnrthv 
that the AIOC originally intended to resolve the dispute based on the 
legal advice provided by counsel for the AIOC.no The said legal 
recommended a consortium agreement and an "umbrella treaty" be­
tween ^an and the United Kingdom that incorporates the consortium 
agreement, ni The combined effect of the agreements, as recom­
mended, would have been to make a breach of the consortium 
agreement ipso facto amount to a breach of the umbrella treaty. The 
umbrella treaty was not part of the terms with which the dispute was 
eventually resolved Still, the umbrella treaty clause that was for­
mulated by the counsel to the AIOC was the basis of the umbrella 
clause found m the Abs-Shawcross Draft that developed into the clause 
north*J*1 m the m°del BITS °f C0untries mostly from the global 
The arbitral tribunals conflicting decisions in SGS v. Paki­
stan1" and\ SGS v. Philippines115 will go down in the history of the 
evolution of international investment law and investment arbitration 
as one of the most controversial interpretation of the umbrella clause, 
including their roles in the internationalization of investment disputes, 
ne decisions are by far the most dominant example of the entrench-
107. Sinclair, supra note 98, at 414. 
s"°ne; X n°te at 144 ("AI0C Pre«>iled on the British Government, a major 
^ t° AIOC' t0 imtiate claims against Iran with the ICJ, which declined to exer-
ov<»r »hn!?IC °LVer the d,sPute- Specifically, the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction 
tion j because the terms of Iran's acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdic-
treaties "0t eXtend to a"e8at'0ns °f breach of customary international law, as opposed to 
109. Id. at 146. 
pathf' The legal adviCG WaS Provided t0 by Elihu Lauterpacht. See Elihu Lauter-
ONQ Xn'.ltf[nat'<mal ^aw and Private Foreign Investment, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEOAL STUD. 
11 (1997): see also Sinclair, supra note 98, at 415-17. 
jjl. Lauterpacht, supra note 110, at 271. 
2. Wong, supra note 9, at 144; see also Sinclair, supra note 98, at 414. 
H3. Id. 
ARR/ni/v>0C'ete ^enera^e de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., ICSID Case No. 
AU/U, Objections to Jurisdiction (Aug. 6, 2003), 8 ICSID Rep. 406. 
Obi Jt• S°ciete ^enefale de Surveillance SA v. Republic of Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, 
J ctions to Jurisdiction (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 515 (2005). 
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ment of the Abs-Shawcross Draft. The intention of the Draft was to 
elevate contractual investment claims to treaty claims.1,(5 An elevation 
in this respect internationalizes investment disputes. The SGS deci­
sions have been widely criticized mainly because the rulings confused 
the issue of jurisdiction over contractual and treaty claims in the arbi­
tration of investment claims.117 The underlying investment contracts 
in issue in those cases contained an exclusive forum selection clause 
that designated a different forum for the settlement of investment dis­
putes contrary to international arbitration under the applicable 
BITs.118 The two main issues in the SGS cases was whether an arbitral 
tribunal may exercise jurisdiction over breach of contract claims based 
on the application of an umbrella clause, and if so, whether the same 
arbitral tribunal may not be restricted where the underlying contract 
contains an exclusive forum selection clause contrary to the BIT under 
review.The SGS v. Pakistan arbitral tribunal held that an arbitral 
tribunal lacks jurisdiction on the ground that an umbrella clause do 
not extend to contractual claims.1*" In the SGS v. Philippines case 
which was on all fours with SGS v. Pakistan, the former held that it 
has jurisdiction over contractual claims, but went further to state that 
an arbitral tribunal should not exercise jurisdiction where the invest­
ment contract contains an exclusive forum selection clause for the 
Toth nT, • VeStTnt duisPute121 In hi* analysis, Wong answered 
both questions raised in the SGS cases in the affirmative. - On his 
part, Crawford was reluctant to take a definite stand, noting: 
t,hiS iSSUG for a^ es' and *  ^
lecture Hf nnt tS °f ***** which in the confines of a 
must Lv that T finHT ""l **** t0 ** able to settle" But... I 
disturbing uP thG CUFrent lGVel Census on core questions 
Itrmfnff na°ttphe T^ - T?* in the SGS Cases was an attemPt to 
disputes through tl^ ° f",, ,1011 tbiat internationalizes investment 
rS Umbre!la C,ause' and FET standard in most BITs. 
sionTerfuS w n n T  °f the SGS Cases to the confu" 
Junsdlctlonal issues is a major shortcoming and a disservice 
116. Sinclair, supra note 98, at 412. 
117. See Wong, supra note 9. 
515, at 1 67. lCRepubllC °fPak-> 8 ICSID Rep. 406, at 1 88; Republic of Phil., 8 ICSID Rep. 
119. See Wong, supra note 9, at 137. 
120. Islamic Republic ofPak., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13 at 1 162 
21. RepubUc of Phil, 8 ICSID Rep. 515, at f 155 1 162' 
Wong, supra note 9, at 137. 
123. Crawford, supra note 6, at 353. 
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— V^pu£ati°nS t0  ^ -^tionali^ ion 
Except that the SGS e. Pakistan tribunal resisted the attempt 
to elevate contractual breaches to BIT violations- there has been I 
consistent pattern by arbitral tribunals to internationalize investment 
disputes through the broad application of umbrella clauses since the 
decisions in the SGS cases.- For example, in the annulment proceed-
mgs of Campania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal 
LK r£entine Republic, the claim was a review of the $300 million 
damages investment arbitration commenced by the claimants a 
French company organized under the laws of the Respondent through 
their Argentine affiliate - In this case, the Respondent did not di­
rectly or affirmatively interfere in the investment by Tucuman but 
claimants alleged that the failure of the Respondent to prevent the 
Province of Tucuman from refraining to take certain actions against 
the concession contract infringed their rights under the France-Argen­
tina BIT.127 The contentious concession contract did not make any 
reference to the France-Argentina BIT or the ICSID Convention, ex-
cept that the BIT contained some remedial provisions.128 The ad hoc 
Committee characterized the remedial measures in the BIT as "an in­
ternational law standard, expressly or by clear implication," applying 
to 'investments made by investors."1211 However, the concession con­
tract which is one of the most common forms of state contracts 
provided for a forum selection clause.^ This was to the effect that the 
resolution of any dispute arising from the concession contract, concern­
ing its interpretation and application, was to be submitted to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the contentious administrative courts of 
124. Islamic Republic of Pak., 8 ICSID Rep. 406, at <fl 163. 
t r n f 5  •  p e e  8 e n e r a / ! y >  Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbi-
L 'v"1' 'r™atlzln8 Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM 
L- REV. 1521 (2004). 
126. Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, 
ecision on Annulment, fl 11 (July 3, 2002), 6 ICSID Rep. 340 (2004) [hereinafter Vivendi). 
ment f fiTe"^' ® ICSID Rep. 340, at f 9. See generally, Agreement between the Govern-
o tie French Republic and the Government of the Argentine Republic on the 
17OOPI?XT '>romot'on and Protection of Investments (Translation), Fr.-Arg., July 3, 1991, 
1728 U.N.T.S. 298 [hereinafter France-Argentina BIT|. 
Are^ V ® ICSID Rep. 340, at 1 11 (explaining that Articles 3 and 5 of the France-
ble t" me Prov'des, inter alia, that "the Contracting Parties shall grant fair and equita-
inv f^atmen^ according to the principles of international law to investments made by 
in T °r'! °' °Hler Party landl that investments shall enjoy protection and full security 
°niitted) anCG Princlp'e °f lair and equitable treatment. . .") (internal quotations 
129- Id. at 117, H 59. 
190. Id. 
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Tucuman.131 On the core issue of whether the forum selection clause in 
the concession contract should be accepted and applied by the tribunal 
to set aside the remedial provisions in the France-Argentine BIT, the 
ad hoc Committee upheld the submissions of the Claimants finding 
"that the fact that the investments concerns a Concession Contract 
made with Tucuman . . . does not mean that the dispute falls outside 
the scope of the BIT."132 This ad hoc Committee advertently or perhaps 
inadvertently, embraced the theory of the internationalization of state 
contracts as applicable under international investment law and arbi­
tration.133 The ad hoc Committee was unequivocal when it found: 
[W]here the "fundamental basis of the claim" is a treaty [an invest­
ment treaty] laying down an independent standard by which the 
conduct of the parties is to be judged, the existence of an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause in a contract between the claimant and the re­
spondent state or one of its subdivisions cannot operate as a bar to 
the application of the treaty standard.134 
In reaching its conclusion on this issue, the ad hoc Committee reasoned 
that the determination whether the act of a state is internationally 
wrongful is a question of international law that is not impacted by a 
consideration of whether or not the same act could be lawful under na­
tional law.135 
Similarly, the ad hoc arbitration case Eureko B. V. u. Republic of 
Roland,1™ also involved a concession contract between the parties. 
1 he facts and issues raised in this investment treaty arbitration were 
similar to those of Vivendi. One of the main issues for determination in 
this investment treaty arbitration was whether alleged breaches of 
contract-based claims governed by national law could be separated 
from alleged BIT violation without recourse to the interpretation and 
application of the contract under review in the investment dispute.137 
ollowing Vivendi as a persuasive authority, the ad hoc Committee 
held as follows: 
^eH1pnri1v»fPlit"de auti1°rity for the proposition that when a 
! '.an "wester 0f the beneflt of jtg contractua, rights> 
lation nf the + ln'C f' ma:y tantamount to a deprivation in vio­
lation of the type of provision contained in Article 5 of the Treaty. 
131. Vivendi, 6 ICSID Rep. 340 at 1 11 
132. Id. at H 75. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 1 101. 
135. Vivendi, 6 ICSID Rep. 340 at fl 102-03. 
(2005). ^ Eurek° B V" v- RePublic of Poland, Partial Award, IIC 98 Ad Hoc Tribunal 
137. Id. K 102, at 41. 
2017INTERNATIONALIZATION OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 245 
^ i too ^ ^ ^  expropriatory in sub­stance and in effect.138 
The scholarship and jurisprudence on the extensive, and some­
times extreme, analysis of the effect of umbrella clauses and FET and 
their contributions to the internationalization of investment disputes 
misses a vital consideration. Granted that the overwhelming support 
for the protection of foreign investments in the host state is valid for 
obvious reasons. Often when investment disputes arising from under­
lying investments are elevated to treaty claims under applicable BITs, 
the economic and sovereign regulatory power of the host state is re­
strained. When this occurs, host states are left with no plank to stand 
on to articulate and assert their expectations in the context of interna­
tional investment law and arbitration. There is little or no analysis of 
the effect of this on the economy and international investment regimes 
of host states, particularly from the global south. The international in­
vestment law regime and arbitration should not simply be a 
mechanism for the protection of investments. There is a need to recog­
nize and analyze the component of the promotion of investment for 
contribution to the economic development inherent in the host state's 
regulatory authority for economic development considerations. Some 
host states in the global south are agitated.139 Some have responded to 
what might be considered as a one-sided approach to international in­
vestment law and arbitration in ways that can undermine its 
progress.110 Admittedly, the lacuna created as a result of the insuffi­
cient consideration of the full implications of the internationalization 
138. Id. at H 241. 
139. See generally, Thomas Schultz & Cedric Dupont, Investment Arbitration: Promot­
ing the Rule of Law or Over-empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study, 25 EUR. 
J. INT'I. L. 1147 (2014); see also MICHAEL WAIBEL, THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBI­
TRATION (Michael Waibel ed., 2010). 
140. See Suzanne A. Spears, Making Way for the Public Interest in International Invest­
ment Agreements, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 271, 273 
• Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011) (noting that "[sjtates have responded to concerns 
about the potential for investment law to place undue constraints on sovereign regulatory 
power in a variety of ways in recent years. At one extreme, a number of countries in Latin 
America have responded by denouncing or insisting on the renegotiation of some of their 
As (international investment agreements), and by withdrawing from the Convention on the 
'ettlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (ICSID 
invention) or seeking to limit the jurisdiction of the Centre established by the Convention 
SID)."); see also Peter Muchlinski, Trends in International Investment Agreements: Bal­
ancing Investor Rights and the Right to Regulate: The Issue of National Security, in 
EARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2008-2009 35 (Karl P. Sauvant 
® •• 2009). See generally Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, A Coming Crisis: Expansionary 
1 rends in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in APPEAI.S MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL DIS­
PUTES 39 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2008). 
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of investment disputes on the host state cannot be placed on the door­
steps of arbitral tribunals or foreign investors alone. Host states have a 
responsibility to properly define and clarify their legal and regulatory 
regime on foreign investments. 
CONCLUSION 
The opposing views of Calvo and Hull, mostly addressed the is­
sue of expropriation under international law at the time. It is fair to 
state, with some plausibility, that the act of expropriation is at the root 
of most international investment disputes. At the height of the conflict 
between the Calvo doctrine and the Hull formula, expropriation meant 
the actual taking of the alien property by the host state. The notion of 
expropriation has broadened over time. Under international invest­
ment law and arbitration, the act or omission of the host state that 
directly or indirectly infringes on the proprietary rights of the foreign 
investor is expropriation. This expanded notion is hinged on the obliga­
tion on the host state to guarantee the observance of contractual 
obligations entered with foreign investors under BITs and independent 
foreign investment related contracts. Despite the failure of the interna­
tional minimum standard to satisfy the test of customary international 
law, the concept has been reincarnated through standard provisions in 
BITs such as umbrella clauses and the FET standard. 
Considering the evolution of investment law and arbitration, it 
is not a good approach by the global south to rely on national laws, or 
contracts founded on same, to regulate and interpret international in­
vestment law obligations and dispute resolution mechanisms. In cases 
where national laws have been clearly applied to settlements of invest­
ment isputes, umbrella clauses have been upheld and applied broadly 
RTTnt^ru ati°naliZe the disputes by subjecting it to the provisions of the 
Bit This is a lesson the global south should draw from the historical 
development and evolution of international investment law and arbi-
ra ion. ese countries should take steps to re-negotiate and insert 
clauses in their BITs that reflect their expectations, particularly as it 
pertains to covered investments, investment dispute resolution mecha­
nisms, and considerations of contribution to economic development by 
the covered investments. Doing nothing will create more confusion and 
frustration with the investment treaty arbitration regime. The situa-
oZTn TTw3 maS?iYe withdrawal from the ICSID Convention 
anrpd an 11 Tld addressed with a smarter and a more bal-
and arbitration V ^ g bal south to international investment law 
